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This paper studies the economic determinants of corporate tax revenue to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) across European Union members over the period 1998-2009.  
The  Feasible  Generalized  Least  Squares  (FGLS)  regression  results  suggest  that  structural, 
cyclical, international and institutional factors such as GDP, Government Deficit, Industry 
Turnover,  Unemployment,  Number  of  Enterprises,  Trade  Openness,  Foreign  Direct 
Investment (FDI) and Corruption affect revenue performance of an economy. Thus, the 
findings  show  that  Unemployment  Rate  and  Corruption  have  an  adverse  effect  on  tax 
collection, while the other analysed factors contribute to a better performance concerning 
tax collection.  
In the present paper we also consider as explanatory factors the tax variables Effective 
Average Tax Rate (EATR) and Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR). In fact, empirical 
results  indicate  a  parabolic  relationship  between  EMTR  and  corporate  tax  revenues, 
reinforcing the hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve.  
Our findings also suggest that the last two years of European Union enlargement are likely 
not to have had effect in corporate tax revenue to GDP. In addition, specific factors of some 
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) seem to positively affect corporate revenues. 
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1.  Introduction 
The economic crisis that the world faced in recent years has decisively contributed to the 
current instability in the Europe, triggering a new crisis which may be entitled “Sovereign 
Debt Crises”. 
The debt levels of European nations have increased in recent years threatening the integrity 
of the Euro Zone. 
Austerity measures, rescue plans, financing and refinancing of public debt are the current 
slogans of European leaders. In fact, there are deep financial and budgetary problems in the 
European Union members that require clear and decisive orders.  
We are aware that the recovery process will be uneven, with a higher growth rate in some 
countries than others and several further reasons can justify such differences. 
Given that fiscal policy is currently one of the main macroeconomic policy instruments 
available in each country, our analysis will focus in the fiscal policy on the revenue side; 
more precisely, we will study the main economic determinants of corporate tax revenue in 
European Union over the period 1998-2009. 
In this context it is important to highlight that we chose not to analyze the tax revenue as a 
whole but only the corporate tax revenue, taking into consideration the relevant role of 
corporate sector – the creation of new businesses and their investments, as well as the 
added value generated by them, which contribute to economic growth and development of a 
country.  
In  this  sense,  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  effect  of  structural,  cyclical, 
international and  institutional variables on  the  corporate  revenue  performance.  We  will 
analyze  the  impact  of  GDP,  Government  Deficit,  Unemployment,  Industrial  Turnover, 
Trade  Openness,  High-tech  exports,  Corruption  and  other  variables  on  the  ratio  of 
corporate tax revenue to GDP. 
We must refer that, regarding this topic, there is a considerable number of studies. Some of 
them  focus  their  analysis  on  the  determinants  of  the  government  revenue,  and  some 
emphasize the factors to set the tax rates, while others examine the controversy relationship 3 
 
between  tax rates  and  revenues.  While  some  authors  study  developed  countries, others 
prefer  to  understand  developing  countries.  Notwithstanding,  literature  review  shall  be 
discussed in detail on Chapter 2 of this document. 
Although  some  previous  studies  focus  on  the  OECD  (Organization  for  Economic  Co-
operation and Development) members, developing countries or even a small number of 
European Union members (EU15), in a few years, in the present analysis we will extend the 
literature taking into account the 27 European Union members for the period 1998-2009.  
Besides the more recent time series and the broader sample of European Union members, 
this  paper  explores  the  effective  tax  burden  employing  the  EATR  and  the  EMTR  as 
exogenous tax variables.  
With this analysis we would like to answer questions as simple as: Does a variation in the 
EATR or EMTR trigger a change in corporate tax revenue? Is there a revenue-maximizing 
corporate income tax rate? Does Government Deficit or Trade Openness or still Corruption 
affect corporate tax revenue? 
To help answering these and other questions we use econometric specifications applying 
the panel FGLS cross-section weights method.  
This paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we analyze some papers that provide a 
theoretical and empirical knowledge about the present study; In Chapter 3, we explain the 
data and methodology adopted; Chapter 4 shows the empirical analysis and results; and, 
finally, Chapter 5 points out the main conclusions. 
2.  Literature review 
The main determinants of tax revenue, corporate tax rate, as well as the paradox between 
corporate tax rate and its revenue have attracted the attention of many different researchers. 
In this sense, there is a considerable set of studies examining the trends in corporate tax 
revenues,  corporate  income  tax  rates  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  relevant  factors  that 
influence these variables triggering the observed trends and fluctuations. 4 
 
It is important to refer that most of the aforementioned analysis is focused on developed 
countries,  but  many  other  studies  have  focused  their  attention  in  developing  countries, 
stressing institutional factors, which are characteristic of these countries. 
2.1. The determinants of corporate tax revenues 
The corporate sector and all its surrounding are important determinants of tax revenues. 
Nevertheless, will be profits or losses an immediate influence of tax revenues? Auerbach 
and Poterba (1988) consider the sources of the decline in U.S. (United States of America) 
corporate income tax revenues over the period 1959-1985. Douglas (1990) does a similar 
analysis for Canada over the period 1960-1985.  
Both  papers  decompose  the  tax  revenue  share  into  the  tax  rate  and  the  profit  rate,  as 
Taxes/Assets = Taxes/Profits ∗ Profits/Assets, and they both conclude that it is declining 
profitability,  rather  than  declining  tax  rates,  that  explains  the  bulk  of  the  reduction  in 
corporate income tax revenues.  
However, the sources of the declining profitability are not systematically addressed, and the 
tax rate formulation does not allow a separate consideration of the statutory tax rate and the 
tax base. 
Still in the corporate sector, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) consider the related question 
of how tax motivated transfer pricing issues affect corporate income tax revenues. Their 
empirical approach relates differences in tax rates (between the country and the OECD 
average) to a ratio of value added to labor compensation, with a data set that considers this 
relationship  for  16  countries  over  19  years  (1979-1997).  Findings  indicate  a  negative 
relationship between value added and country tax rates, evidence that the authors interpret 
as indicating profit shifting toward low-tax countries. Therefore, the authors suggest that a 
one  percent  increase  in  the  corporate  income  tax  rate  will  lead  to  a  small  decrease  in 
corporate tax revenues. 
Another  important  factor  that  intuitively  determines  tax  revenues  is  the  country’s 
relationship with foreign countries. Gropp and Kostial (2000) e B´enassy-Qu´er´e et al. 
(2000) both consider the connection between foreign investment, tax rates, and corporate 5 
 
tax revenues. Both analyses demonstrate that foreign investment is sensitive to tax rate 
differences. Gropp and Kostial find that this effect is statistically significantly larger for 
countries  that  exempt  foreign  income  from taxation.  The  subsequent  papers  proceed  to 
perform  simulated  calculations  regarding  how  European  Union  tax  rate  harmonization 
would affect revenues in European Union countries. Gropp and Kostial suggest that high 
tax countries would gain revenue from harmonization. Additionally, both studies find that 
the net foreign direct investment positions of European Union countries are likely to be 
affected. 
Despite all factors mentioned above, the corporate income tax base cannot be forgotten. 
Thus,  Devereux  et  al.  (2004)  consider  U.K.  (United  Kingdom)  corporate  tax  revenues 
between 1980 and 2004, focusing on the puzzling combination of reductions in corporate 
statutory tax rates and increases in corporate revenue. They conclude that this puzzle is 
partially a result of measures that increased the breadth of the corporate income tax base. In 
addition, the growing size and profitability of the financial sector is likely to have increased 
the taxable income generated by the corporate sector. 
Still in line with the above mentioned rational, Clausing (2007) studies variation among 
OECD countries in the size of corporate income tax revenues relative to GDP over the 
period 1979-2002. The decomposition explains such variation as a function of the statutory 
tax rate, the breadth of the tax base, corporate profitability, and the share of the corporate 
sector in GDP. Empirical results indicate a parabolic relationship between tax rates and 
revenues, implying a revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate of 33% for the whole 
sample. This revenue-maximizing rate is found to decrease as economies are smaller and 
more integrated with the world economy. 
Likewise, Stinespring (2009) addressed the hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve for 
the corporate income tax. His studies estimate the impact of corporate income tax rates on 
corporate tax revenue at the state level over the period 1996-2007.  Following standard 
theoretical constructions, corporate income tax revenues are characterized as a quadratic 
function  of  the  corporate  tax  rate,  which  support  the  hypothesis  under  consideration. 
Results also show the revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate has declined over time. The 6 
 
rates range from 8.52% to 9.32% for the time period 1996-2002 and 6.03% to 7.47% over 
2004-2007.  
2.2. The determinants of corporate tax rates  
Taking into consideration the above, the determinants of corporate tax rates should also be 
pointed out instead of the determinants of tax revenues.  Hence, concerning the present 
subject, it would be interesting to address the question of how countries set their corporate 
tax rates.  
Economic  integration  could  be  a  factor  of  the  strength  of  agglomerative  forces,  which 
establish  the  link  between  economic  integration  and  tax  competition.  For  this  reason, 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) examine the determinants of corporate income tax rates for 
14  OECD  countries  between  1967  and  1996  and  they  find  evidence  in  support  of  the 
hypothesis  that  greater  international  integration  will  lower  corporate  income  tax  rates. 
Rodrik (1997) has a similar finding. 
In addition, the tax background could also be an indicator of the current fiscal situation. 
Mutti (2003) considers the determinants of changes in corporate income tax rates across 
countries. The analysis focuses on 60 countries in the years 1984, 1992, and 1996. He 
considers how the change in the corporate income tax rate is affected by the initial rate and 
use in his analysis dummy variables for poor countries, small countries and openness. Mutti 
finds that small countries and countries with higher initial statutory tax rates are both likely 
to see greater reductions in their statutory corporate income tax rate than other countries. 
Furthermore, he admits the possibility that the individual and corporate rates are related. 
Other  authors  emphasize  the  determinants  of  a  company’s  effective  tax  burden.  For 
example, Simon Loretz (2009) examined a large panel of nearly 8,000 bilateral effective 
tax rates within the OECD and suggests that country size is an important determinant of the 
effective tax rate. In line with the literature, bilateral tax rates with small host countries 
exhibit a smaller overall effective tax rate, despite the fact that larger countries are more 
likely to reduce the tax burden by means of tax treaties at a bilateral level. Further, they 
intend  that  Trade  Openness  is  an  aspect  of  economic  integration  (mobility  factor)  and 7 
 
expect a negative sign given the reduced scope for taxation, because mobile factors can 
respond faster to changes in taxation. 
Another point of view is defended by Slemrod (2004). The author considers variation in 
corporate tax rates over 90 countries and 4 years (1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995). Dependent 
variables examined include the individual income tax rate, an interaction term with capital 
gains  exclusion,  government  expenditure to  GDP ratio,  oil,  electricity  and  measures  of 
openness. He goes on to observe that in certain specifications of his model, a greater degree 
of openness predicts lower tax rates in certain years. Some evidence of a Laffer effect, 
although  not  explicitly  acknowledged  by  Slemrod,  as  he  writes,  “While  a  policy  of 
openness may contribute to driving down the rate of taxation per unit of investment, bigger, 
more globalized economies attract a higher base for corporate taxation, and, therefore, can 
collect more revenue from taxing corporate income”. 
Results also indicate that there is little evidence that corporate tax rates are driven by a 
country’s revenue needs and expenditures are not related to tax rates. 
2.3. The determinants of tax revenue in developing countries 
In this subsection the institutional factors and the characteristics of developing countries 
demonstrate their relevance. Lotz and Morss (1967) find that per capita income and trade 
share are determinants of the tax share, and this finding has been replicated since. 
In a similar study, Tanzi (1992) finds that half of the variation in the tax ratio is explained 
by per capita income, import share, agriculture share and foreign debt share.  
From another point of view, various studies explain that collection of tax revenue is one of 
the important areas where corruption is most likely to arise (Galtung (1995), Li (1997), 
Toye and Moore (1998), Tanzi (2000), Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003)).  
Some of the factors that contribute to corruption in tax system are as follows: 
‒  A complex and fragmented tax system increases the demand for corruption; 
‒  Complexity in the paying tax procedures leads to corruption; 
‒  Another factor that fosters corruption is high tax rates, since they incentive tax evasion; 8 
 
‒  In order to indulge corrupt behavior, individuals compare its benefits with the risk of 
detection  and  punishment,  they  engage  in  corrupt  activities  if  they  feel  that  the 
expected punishment is low; and 
‒  Finally, low wages of tax administration and tax payers also foster corruption. 
In fact, the impact of corruption and tax evasion on tax revenue is not new in the field of 
public finance. In a series of paper Tanzi and Dvoodi (1997) have provided evidence that 
countries with high level of corruption tend to have lower collection of tax revenues in 
relation to GDP. Since some of the taxes paid by taxpayers are diverted away from public 
accounts. 
Sanyal et al. (1998) investigate the relationship between corruption, tax evasion and Laffer 
curve. The study explains that a corrupt tax administration leads to Laffer curve behavior.  
Ghura (1998) concludes that the tax ratio rises with income and degree of openness, and 
falls with the share of agriculture in GDP. He also finds that other factors like corruption, 
structural  reforms  and  human  capital  development  affect  the  tax  ratio.  While  a  rise  in 
corruption is linked with a decline in tax ratio, structural reforms and an increase in the 
level of human capital are associated with an increase in tax ratio.  
In  the  same  way,  Gupta  (2007)  studies  the  principal  determinants  of  tax  revenue 
performance across developing countries by using a broad dataset (105 countries over 25 
years). The results confirm that structural factors, such as per capita GDP, agriculture share 
in GDP, trade openness and foreign aid, significantly affect the revenue performance of an 
economy.  However, other factors such as corruption, political stability, share of direct and 
indirect taxes also affect tax revenue.  
Similarly, Ajaz and Ahmed study institutional problems in developing countries, namely 
the corruption in tax administration and the low quality of governance. The study analyzes 
the  effect  of  institutional  and  structural  variables  (corruption  and  governance)  on  tax 
revenues using panel data set for 25 developing countries during 1990- 2005. Once again, 
the  results  show  that  corruption  has  an  adverse  effect  on  tax  collection,  while  good 
governance contributes to better performance in tax collection. 9 
 
To summarize, most studies find that per capita GDP and degree of openness is positively 
related to  revenue performance, but  a higher agriculture share  and adverse institutional 
factors are more likely to lower it.  
2.4. The corporate income tax rate – tax revenue paradox 
As we will demonstrate in the following chapter, there are different trends in tax rate and 
tax revenue, while one increases the other shows significant falls.  
In fact, these tendencies can be justified by a plenty of reasons related to, for example, a 
rise of profits, an increase of corporatization, or a growth of capital gains, besides changes 
in effective tax burden. 
Auerbach (2006) points out a relatively stable ratio of U.S. federal tax revenues from non-
financial corporations to GDP. He defends that this probably masks a declining ratio of 
corporate profits of these corporations relative to GDP and an increasing average tax rate 
on these profits. He claims that the average corporate tax rate rose steadily between 1996 
and 2003 in large part because of the importance of tax losses, reflecting the asymmetric 
treatment of gains and losses under the corporate income tax and caused by a growing 
dispersion in profit outcomes among firms (i.e. many firms have losses even when the 
overall rate of profit is not low). 
Sørensen (2006) argues that the rate-revenue paradox may be explained by an increasing 
corporatization,  itself  caused  by  subsequent  decline  of  certain  sectors  in  which  non-
corporate  organizational  form  dominates,  by  the  income  shift  between  personal  and 
corporate income and, finally, base broadening. De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) argue that 
the simultaneous decline in corporate tax rates and rising tax-to-GDP ratios in Europe may 
to  a  large  extent  be  explained  by  a  growing  corporatization  and  income  shifting  from 
personal to corporate income tax. According to their findings, since the early 1990s income 
shifting  could  have  raised  the  share  of  corporate  tax  revenue  in  GDP  by  nearly  0.25 
percentage points. 
According to the above, Swiston et al. (2007) consider the role of personal and corporate 
income tax, capital gains and income distribution as factors explaining the vast majority of 10 
 
variations of tax revenue. They find that the 2004-2006 increase of the tax to GDP ratio in 
the U.S. is mainly due to the growth of corporate profits and capital gains. These two 
determinants of tax revenue each contribute to a 40 percent increase in the tax to GDP ratio.  
Swiston  et  al.'s  analysis  of  time  series  adjusted  for  tax  policy  changes  suggests  that 
corporate income tax is the most volatile revenue component. They conclude that because 
of capital income volatility over the analyzed business cycle, the observed surge in tax 
revenue buoyancy is a temporary phenomenon. 
Piotrowska  and  Vanborren  (2008)  analyze,  in  Europe,  the  absence  of  reflection  of  the 
decline in the corporate tax rates in the tax to GDP ratio. The authors explore to what extent 
the observed trend can be explained by changes in the effective tax burden on corporate 
income, in the share of total income accruing to the corporate sector and in total business 
income relative to GDP. The main results suggest that corporatization is the driving factor 
for the trend observed in corporate tax revenues, similar to Sorensen’s results. 
Finally, Creedy e Gemmell (2007) consider to what extent the observed volatility in the 
buoyancy of the corporate tax revenues in the U.K. in 1992-2004 could be determined by 
the fiscal drag properties of the tax system. Creedy and Gemmel show that deductions play 
an important role in determining the rate of growth of corporate tax revenues relative to 
profits. 
This analysis differs from previous literature because it seeks to analyze the effect of some 
institutional  factors  in  developed  countries,  regardless  the  fact  that  they  are  more 
characteristic  and  expressive  in  developing  countries  (e.g.,  Corruption).  Additionally, 
although  there  are  many  studies  related  to  some  countries  of  European  Union,  this 
document differs either in the selected time series, or in the broader sample of countries 
belonging to the European Union. 
Moreover, the EATR and the EMTR appear in this study as exogenous variables (a proxy 
of  effective  tax  levels)  using  a  model  approach  based  on  the  Devereux/Griffith 
methodology. 11 
 
Finally, in the present study corporate tax revenue will not be solely explained by changes 
in corporate income tax rate, but also by different economic and structural factors, some of 
them are mentioned above. 
3.  Data and methodology   
Our analysis will focus on the 27 current European Union  members over the 12  years 
between 1998 and 2009.  
It  should  be  noted  that  this  analysis  was  performed  for  European  Union  countries  for 
various reasons. First, data on main variables are more available for these countries. Then, 
this analysis shall be relevant in the current conjuncture of financial, economic and even 
political crisis that the European Union faces, where fiscal policy assumes an increasingly 
key  role.  And,  finally,  this  study  provides  a  diversified  analysis  in  respect  of  whether 
quantitative  variables  like  GDP,  Industrial  Turnover,  Unemployment  or  qualitative 
variables such us the level of Corruption. 
3.1. Data Description 
The  countries  included  in  the  analysis  are  the  European  Union  members.  These  27 
countries  are  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia, 
Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands,  Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,  Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom.  
Variable definitions and data statistics are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Explanatory 
Variable  Definitions  Prediction 
CIT 
Corporate Income Tax (as % of GDP) – Taxes on the income or profits 
of corporations including holding gains as percentage of GDP  N.A. 
EATR 
Effective Average Tax Rate (%) – is a measure of the effect of tax on a 
non-marginal  investment.  A  non-marginal  investment  is  one  that  not 
only covers all of its economic costs but also provides an economic or 
above-normal profit to the investor. So the EATR is a measure of the 
proportion of pre-tax economic profit that the investor gets to keep after 
paying corporate tax. 
EATR  may  be  a  better  indicator  of  the  tax  incentives  facing  a 
multinational corporation in deciding on a country for locating a large, 
discrete  investment  project,  especially  where  the  corporation  has  a 
(+) 12 
 
strong expectation that it will earn economic profit due to a patent or 
similar source of market power.  
EATR was derived from the raw tax data and corresponds to overall 
mean of: Asset – industrial buildings, intangibles, machinery, financial 
assets, inventory; and, Source of Finance – retained earnings, new equity 
and debt.  
EMTR 
Effective Marginal Tax Rate (%) – is a measure of the effect of tax on 
the return to a marginal investment. A marginal investment is one that 
just breaks even or covers all of its economic costs, including a return to 
the  labour  and  capital  that  may  be  provided  by  the  owner  of  the 
investment.  A  marginal  investment  returns  a  normal  profit  to  the 
investor. 
The effect of tax on the return to a marginal investment depends not 
only  on  the  statutory  corporate  tax  rate  but  also  on  depreciation 
allowances and any available corporate tax concessions.  
EMTR was derived from the raw tax data and corresponds to overall 
mean of: Asset – industrial buildings, intangibles, machinery, financial 
assets, inventory; and, Source of Finance – retained earnings, new equity 
and debt. 
(+) 
GDP_PPS  GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards  
(Index: EU-27 = 100)  (+) 
INDUSTRY 
TURNOVER  
Industry turnover index –  Annual data for intermediate and capital 
goods (2005 = 100)   (+) 
GOSMI  
Gross  Operating  Surplus  and  Mixed  Income  (as  %  of  GDP)  – 
Operating  surplus  is  the  surplus  (or  deficit)  on  production  activities 
before account has been taken of the interest, rents or charges paid or 
received for the use of assets. Mixed income is the remuneration for the 
work carried out by the owner (or by members of his family) of an 
unincorporated enterprise. This is referred to as 'mixed income' since it 




Total  Number  of  Enterprises  (units)  –  The  number  of  enterprises 
active  during  at  least  part  of  the  reference  period  in  the  following 
sectors: Manufacturing, Mining and Quarrying, Electricity, Gas Water 
Supply,  Construction,  Wholesale,  Retail  Trade,  Repair  of  motor 
vehicles,  motorcycles  and  personal  and  household  goods,  Hotels  and 
Restaurants, Transport, Storage, Communication, Real estate, Renting 




Unemployment  rate  (as  %  of  labour  force)  –  Unemployment  rate 
represents unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The 
labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. 
Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were:  
a. without work during the reference week,  
b. currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment 
or  self-employment  before  the  end  of  the  two  weeks  following  the 
reference week, 
c. actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks 
period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-
employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of, at 




Inward Foreign Direct Investment from the rest of the world (as 
% of GDP) – This indicator is the ratio between the inward Foreign 
Direct Investment and GDP. It covers investment from the rest of the 
World. Data for the EU Member States includes investment from all 
(+) 13 
 
foreign countries (including Intra- EU investment). FDI is the category 
of international investment made by a resident entity (direct investor) 
to acquire a lasting interest of at least 10% of the equity capital of an 
entity operating in an economy other than that of the investor (direct 
investment enterprise). Inward FDI (or FDI in the reporting economy) 
is  investment  by  foreigners  in  enterprises  resident  in  the  reporting 
economy.  Data  are  expressed  as  percentage  to  GDP  to  remove  the 
effect  of  differences  in  the  size  of  the  economies  of  the  reporting 
countries.FDI  flows  denote  the  new  investment  made  during  the 
period.  They  are  recorded  in  the  Balance  of  Payments  financial 
account.FDI stocks (or positions) denote the value of the investment at 
the  end  of  the  period.  They  are  recorded  in  the  International 
Investment Position. Outward FDI stocks are recorded as assets of the 
reporting economy, inward FDI stocks as liabilities. 
TRADE 
OPENNESS  
Trade  Openness  (as  %  of  GDP)  –  This  variable  corresponds  to 
imports of goods and services plus exports of goods and services both 
as percentage of GDP, which represent the value of all goods and other 
market services received/provided from/to the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, 
royalties,  license  fees,  and  other  services,  such  as  communication, 
construction,  financial,  information,  business,  personal,  and 
government services. They exclude compensation of employees and 





High-tech  exports  (as  %  of  total  exports)  –  Exports  of  high 
technology products as a share of total exports.  (+) 
CPI 
Corruption  Perceptions  Index  –  The  CPI  score  indicates  the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory. The 
CPI  is  based  on  13  independent  surveys.  However,  not all  surveys 




Cash  surplus/deficit  (as  %  of  GDP)  –  Cash  surplus  or  deficit  is 
revenue  (including  grants)  minus  expense,  minus  net  acquisition  of 
nonfinancial assets. This cash surplus or deficit is closest to the earlier 
overall  budget  balance  (still  missing  is  lending  minus  repayments, 
which  are  now  a  financing  item  under  net  acquisition  of  financial 
assets). 
(+) 
Table 2: Data Statistics 
Explanatory Variable  Time Period  n  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
CIT  1995-2009  405  3.040  1.303 
EATR  1998-2009  324  25.088  7.291 
EMTR  1998-2009  324  18.884  8.239 
GDP_PPS  1995-2010  404  94.626  44.176 
INDUSTRY 
TURNOVER   1999-2010  273  96.924  23.440 
GOSMI   1999-2010  296  42.119  6.600 
TOTAL NUM 
ENTERPRISES 
1997-2008  301  694,587  905,302 14 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  1995-2010  362  8.215  3.705 
FDI  1995-2010  348  12.349  49.993 
TRADE OPENNESS  1995-2010  402  105.323  49.993 
HTECH EXPORT  1995-2009  319  12.995  12.218 
CPI  1995-2009  363  6.445  1.990 
GOV  
DEFICIT  1995-2009  337  -1.925  3.338 
Data  on  Corporate  Income  Tax  Revenue,  GDP  per  capita,  Industry  Turnover  Index, 
GOSMI, Total Number of Enterprises, Unemployment Rate, FDI and high tech exports 
come from Eurostat databases. 
Data on Trade Openness and General Government Deficit are from World Bank’s, World 
Development Indicators database. 
Corruption Perceptions Index is taken from various surveys and indices published by the 
organization Transparency International. 
And, finally, EATR and EMTR are taken from a report of ZEW – Centre for European 
Economic Research, a project of the European Union Commission.   
3.2. Econometric Model 
In light of the above, we propose the following econometric model describing the corporate 
tax revenue to GDP ratio as a function of a number of variables. The model shall be given 
by: 
Corporate Tax Revenue/GDPit = f (αit; Tax Variablesit; Structural Factorsit; Cyclical 
Business Factorsit; International Factorsit; Institutional 
Factorsit; uit) 
The factors used in the above equation are defined below. In the equation, i refers to a 
country and t refers to a year. 
Now, it is important to explain the list of independent variables and the rationale of their 
influences in ratio corporate tax revenues/GDP. 15 
 
Structural factors 
GDP per capita is a good indicator for the overall development of the economy and it is 
simultaneously used as a proxy for the size of the corporate sector. In fact, it is admissible 
that richer economies have a larger fraction of the economy in the corporate sector and, 
consequently,  it  is  expected  a  positive  relationship  between  these  two  variables  and, 
therefore, between GDP and corporate tax revenue. 
In the same way it may be considered that Government Deficit drives a country’s revenue 
needs, so it is expected a positive sign.  
Cyclical business factors 
GOSMI correspond to the operating surplus of the corporate sector. This variable should be 
treated with caution, because it is not similar to corporate profits. 
Notwithstanding, to address this issue we will also use the Industrial Turnover Index as 
another proxy for the corporate financial results, since it describes the development in the 
turnover of enterprises. 
Despite these variables do not correspond to an economist’s definition of corporate profits, 
they are the few available data for this analysis. 
Unemployment  Rate  is  used  as  a  proxy  to  cyclical  variables  that  should  influence  the 
profitability of corporate firms. In this sense, it is expected a negative relationship between 
this variable and corporate revenues. 
Total Number of enterprises can represent the size of corporate sector. This variable is 
expressed in logarithm form.  
International factors 
Trade  Openness  can  be  a  measure  of  factor  mobility.  The  sign  for  Trade  Openness  is 
negative relative to tax rate, because it is expected a reduced scope for taxation as mobile 
factors can respond faster to changes in taxation, but positive in which concerns to tax 16 
 
revenue. Some studies consider this factor as an aspect of economic integration
1. In the 
same  way,  other  studies  propose  that  more  open  economies  should  experience  higher 
revenues at low tax rates and lower revenues at high tax rates
2. 
Regarding FDI, several studies understand that foreign investment is sensitive to tax rate 
differences.  Thus,  the  investments  in  higher-tax  countries  are  shifting  toward  low-tax 
countries,  which,  consequently,  increase  their  revenues.  Additionally,  it  could  be 
considered  a  proxy to  the  ability  of  multinational  firms  to  respond  to  international  tax 
incentives. 
Besides  being  considered  a  structural  variable  and  a  proxy  to  the  development  of  the 
economy, the High-Tech Exports could contribute to increase the taxable income. Hence, it 
is expected a positive relationship with the endogenous variable.  
Institutional factors 
CPI compares every year the levels of corruption among public officials and politicians. 
The  index  is  based  on  the  perception  of  business  people  and  country  analysts.  When 
corruption  becomes  prevalent,  higher  tax  rates  lead  to  smaller  net  revenues,  so  it  is 
expected a positive relationship between CPI and revenue collections
3.  
3.3. Estimation Technique  
Standard  estimation  by  OLS  (Ordinary  Least  Squares)  implies  that  all  observations  are 
homogeneous regarding the variance of disturbances or “errors” (homocedasticity), so they 
have equal weight in estimation.  
                                                           
1 See Loretz, Simon (2007), “Determinants of Bilateral Effective Tax Rates: Empirical Evidence from OECD 
Countries”. 
2 See Clausing, Kimberly (2007), “Corporate tax revenues in OECD countries”. 
3 In the CPI index higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.   17 
 
Since this study analyzes a panel data, 27 countries over 12 years, we use cross-section 
weights through panel FGLS method of estimation assuming the presence of cross-section 
heteroskedasticity.
4  
In this context, cross-section heteroskedasticity allows for a different error variance for 
each cross section. So the GLS for this specification is straightforward. First, it performs 
preliminary estimation to obtain cross-section specific residual vectors, and then it uses 
these  residuals  to  form  estimates  of  the  cross-specific  variances.  The  estimates  of  the 
variances are then used in a weighted least squares procedure to form the FGLS estimates. 
In this subsection, it is important to refer that despite the FGLS approach considers the 
country’s weight in the variance structure, we use variables like GDP to also demonstrate 
the specific size of the countries, now with a specific coefficient in the equation.  In the 
same way, we used some similar variables, such as Industry Turnover and GOSMI. 
Finally, in all analysis, when we have an expected sign for the variable, we used one-sided 
tests for the individual variables significance test, with exception of FDI and Government 
Deficit, which can reach positive or negative values, so, in these cases, we performed two-
sided tests. 
4.  Empirical analysis and main results  
4.1. Description of main variables 
In this section it is useful to examine the trends in the main variables for this dataset. In this 
sense, Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend of the Statutory Tax Rate, the EATR and the 





                                                           
4 We also experimented other approaches to the data (e.g. fixed and random effects, Generalized method of 



















   
  Figure 1: Average Statutory Tax Rate, EATR and EMTR, EU27 
As mentioned, Figure 1 presents an overview of the corporate tax rates in the European 
Union. Taking into consideration this graph and focusing it only on Statutory Tax Rate, we 
can verify that tax rates have been falling over the time, from an average of 35% in 1995 to 
an average of only 23.5% in 2009 and 23% in 2011. In 2009 and considering the EU15, the 
average Statutory Tax Rate is 27.2%. Nonetheless, this overall average hides considerable 
dispersion in the Statutory Tax Rate levels across the individual Member States. 
In fact, in 2009, the average Statutory Tax Rate is 23.53%, but it is lowest in Cyprus and 
Bulgaria (10%) and the highest in Malta (35%).  
Regarding the EATR, the fall is from an average of 29.27% in 1998 to an average of 
21.49%  in  2009.  In  the  EU15  the  EATR  in  2009  is  25.09%.  The  lowest  EATR  is  in 
Bulgaria (8.8%) while the highest is in France (34.6%).  
Additionally, if we look at the EMTR, the rates decreased from an average of 22% to an 
average of 15.8%, but once again there is a significant dispersion. The EMTR is lowest in 
Belgium (-5.1%) and highest in France (34.9%). In the EU15 the EMTR in 2009 is 18.99%. 
The decline in EATR and EMTR over the time must be mostly driven by cuts on Statutory 
Tax Rates, since those rates highly depend on the Statutory Tax Rates.
5 
                                                           
5 See Elschner, Christina and Vanborren, Wernere (2009), “Corporate effective tax rates in an enlarged 














































































Even though the goal of this paper is not to analyse the wide dispersion of tax levels, there 
are  several  reasons  for  that.  For  example,  size  and  the  economic  development  of  the 
countries can justify these differences. 
Figure 2 turns to the subject of our analysis, corporate tax revenue relative to GDP.  
For  the  average  of  European  Union  members,  corporate  income  tax  relative  to  GDP 
presents  substantial  fluctuations  over  the  period  in  analysis.  It  is  worth  to  stress  the 
decrease between 2000 and 2003 first and 2007 to 2009 later, as well as the considerable 
increase in 2004 to 2007. But it is more important to point out that over these periods the 
tax rates always decreased. Hence, it seems that tax rates are not the only determinants of 









  Figure 2: Average Corporate Income Tax Revenue/GDP 
In this context, Figures 1 and 2 can be reconciled by a diversity of reasons, including a 
number of features of the tax system, such as implementation of fiscal reforms and, on the 
other hand, a number of features of corporate structure, such as a rising corporate profits or 
an increase of enterprises. 
In this section we will also empirically estimate the relationship between corporate tax 
revenues and the variables described in Section 3. In the whole document, we distinguish 
our  analysis  and  examine  the  hypothesis  and  equations  taking  into  account  two  tax 
variables – EATR and EMTR.  20 
 
The results of the regressions are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
4.2. Effective Average Tax Rates as tax variables 
Since corporate tax revenue depends not only on tax rates as fiscal variables, we used some 
structural, cyclical business, international and institutional determinants to understand what 
influence tax revenues. 
In this sense, several alternative specifications were considered to estimate the determinants 
of revenues across countries in European Union.  
















































































Concerning the table abovementioned, Equation (9) includes all variables in analysis (tax, 
structural, cyclical business, international and institutional determinants). 
Firstly, it is considered the relationship between the corporate revenues as a share of GDP 
and the EATR. The tax term coefficient has the positive expected sign and a high degree of 
statistical significance.  
Secondly,  the  data  on  GDP  and  Industry  Turnover  Index  (two  important  variables  to 
control  the  size  of  the  countries  and  the  corporate  financial  results)  demonstrate  the 
consistency with both the intuition and the previous literature (e.g., Auerbach and Poterba 
(1988), Devereux et al. (2004) and Clausing (2007)). Thus, the results indicate that GDP 
and Industry Turnover Index are positive and significantly (at the 1% level of significance) 
related to the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP.
6 
Then, we could verify that as expected GOSMI has a positive influence on revenues while 
the  Unemployment  Rate  has  a  negative  influence.  Both  factors  have  a  high  degree  of 
statistical significance. So, if GOSMI is 1 percentage point higher, ceteris paribus, the ratio 
of corporate tax revenue to GDP is 0.066 percentage points higher. And, if Unemployment 
Rate is 1 percentage point higher, the corporate tax revenue to GDP is 0.063 percentage 
points lower. 
Additionally,  FDI  and  Trade  Openness  capture  the  influence  of  international  factors. 
Results indicate that a higher stock of FDI relative to GDP increases the ratio of corporate 
tax revenue to GDP. And, findings also indicate a positive relationship between the Trade 
Openness and the corporate tax revenue. This result is in line with the previous literature 





                                                           
6 The inclusion of these variables decreases the number of observations (from 12 to 11 years). 
7 GDP variable was found to be statistically insignificant and was dropped from the estimated equations (6), 
(7), (8) and (9). 23 
 
In addition, we considered the following variables: the CPI – an institutional factor – and 
the Government Deficit – a structural factor.
8 As expected, both additional variables have a 
positive  influence  on  revenues  with  a  high  degree  of  statistical  significance.  Thus, 
according to our results, an increase in the CPI score of one point may increase the ratio of 
corporate tax revenue to GDP by up to 0.172 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
So,  once  again,  findings  are  in  line  with  theoretical  literature,  since  a  lower  level  of 
corruption  leads  to  a  higher  revenues  collection  and  the  Government  Deficit  drives  a 
country’s revenue needs (e.g., Sanyal et al. (1998), Gupta (2007) and Slemrod (2004)). 
Finally, we included a new cyclical business factor – Total Number of Enterprises (this 
variable is expressed in logarithm form). One disadvantage associated with employing this 
variable is that the overall number of observations is cut due to an incomplete reporting. 
However, the results indicate that this variable is positive and also statistically significant at 
a level of 1%. Again, these results are in line with the previous findings (Devereux et al. 
(2004), Clausing (2007), Piotrowska and Vanborren (2008)). Note that the Trade Openness 
is the only variable in the specification that has a lower level of significance (5%).
9 
4.3. Effective Marginal Tax Rates as tax variables 
Alternatively to the EATR, we also used the EMTR and made some relevant changes in the 
basic equations. With these changes we emphasize the nature of the relationship between 
tax rates  and  revenue  collections,  which is likely to  be explained  by  a  combination  of 
factors. 
In addition, in this subsection we attempt to obtain some empirical evidence related to the 
hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve.  
                                                           
8 We also tested other institutional variables, like Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of         
    Law, but we do not find a significant effect. As a result we do not include these factors in the regressions.  
9 Sweden is excluded from the present analysis once no data on Government Deficit is available to this   




























































































In Equation (10a) is used both the EMTR and its’ square. This allows the relationship 
between revenues and tax rates to be non-linear, supporting the hypothesis of the existence 
of a Laffer curve. In fact both tax term coefficients have the expected sign and a high 
degree of statistical significance. 
According to other studies, the impact of corporate income tax rates on corporate revenues 
is modelled as a quadratic function. At low tax rates, an increase in the tax rate is likely to 
increase  revenues  and,  on  the  other  hand,  at  higher  tax  rates,  the  elasticity  of  taxable 
income with respect to the tax rate may exceed one, causing revenues to fall as tax rates 
increase. Thus, the capacity to collect taxes increases with the level of tax rates until a 
certain state from which begins to decrease due to the influence of distortion factors, such 
as corruption (Stinespring (2009)).  
Figure 3 maps the resulting revenue curve. Over the entire sample, the revenue-maximizing 









  Figure 3: Corporate Revenue Curve – Equation (10a) 
It  shall  be  noted  that  the  revenue-maximizing  corporate  tax  rate  will  not  necessarily 
correspond to the optimal corporate tax rate, but the relationship between tax rates and 
revenues still has a significant policy interest.
10 
                                                           
10 See Figure 4 in the Appendix 1 with the sketch of the revenue curves for all equations in this subsection.  26 
 
Our  results  also  suggest  that  Industry  Turnover  Index  and  Unemployment  Rate  are 
significantly related to the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP. In fact, these variables are 
statistically significant and present the expected signs. So, these determinants are in line 
with the previous literature (e.g., Auerbach and Poterba (1988), Devereux et al. (2004) and 
Clausing (2007)). For example, if Unemployment Rate increases 1 percentage point, ceteris 
paribus, corporate tax revenue to GDP is 0.033 percentage points smaller.   
Regarding the international factors, we find that FDI and Trade Openness are statistically 
significant (at the 5% and 10% level of significance) and have a positive effect on the ratio 
of corporate tax revenue to GDP.  
Once again the Trade Openness and FDI coefficients have a positive sign, which are in line 
with previous studies (e.g. Ghura (1998), Slemrod (2004), Gupta (2007) and Simon Loretz 
(2007)).  
Additionally, our results show that the Government Deficit variable has a positive sign 
consistent  with  the  foreseen  (e.g.  Slemrod  (2004)).  So,  if  Government  Deficit  is  1 
percentage point higher, ceteris paribus, revenue performance to GDP is 0.139 percentage 
points higher.
11 
When we included the Total Number of Enterprises variable, we find a positive relationship 
between  this  variable  and  revenue  performance  to  GDP.  Notwithstanding,  the  Total 
Number  of  Enterprises  variable  is  statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.  With  the 
increase in the number of variables, the number of observations in this regression only 
amounts to 195.
 12 
It is important to highlight that when we include the institutional factor CPI, this variable 
loses its economic meaning, despite it is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                                           
11 Note that an increase in the value of the Government Deficit variable represents an increase in the surplus  
   and thereby a reduction on the deficit. 
12 Sweden is excluded from the present analysis once no data on Government Deficit is available to this     
   country also Malta due to lack of data. 27 
 
Finally, note that in Equation (7a) we simply replace the Industry Turnover Index by the 
GOSMI variable. The results are similar to those found in previous equations.  
4.4. Dummy Variables: Specific years and countries  
We also experimented to introduce dummy variables indicating if the last two years of 
European Union enlargement, i.e. 2004 and 2007, are relevant for our analysis and, on the 
other hand, if specific factors of some European Union members influence the ratio of 
corporate revenues to GDP, more precisely Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
In these regressions we also replaced the Trade Openness variable by High-tech Export 
variable, but note that in these cases the number of observations decreased even more. 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of the regressions that include dummy variables. 
The results show that the dummy variable that represent the last two years of European 
Union enlargement is not statistically significant in both regressions that use the EATR as a 
tax variable or equations that use the EMTR with the same purpose.
13 
Furthermore, the country-specific dummy variables are found to be statistically significant 
(at the 1% level of significance) suggesting that specific factors of these countries (Greece, 
Portugal and Spain) are also important determinants of variations in the ratio of corporate 
revenues to GDP.
14  
                                                           
13 The results are similar if we analyze the individual years (not reject the null hypothesis). 
14 We also tested these equations specifying other countries, such as France, Germany and United Kingdom,  
   but we obtain ambiguous results and quite different levels of significance. 28 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Corporate Tax Revenue in European Union – EATR  
  (Dummy Variables: Specific years and countries – Complementary Study)  29 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Corporate Tax Revenue in European Union – EMTR   
























5.  Conclusions 
Our  principal  objective  was  to  investigate  corporate  revenue  performance  of  European 
Union over the past 12 years, using panel data set for 27 European Union members during 
the  period  1998-2009.  All  estimates  are  based  on  panel  FGLS  cross-section  weights 
method. 
The main contribution of this study is that it extends the previous literature by considering 
all European Union members, more recent years, the use of effective tax burden through the 
EATR  and  the  EMTR  tax  variables  and,  in  addition,  it  analyzes  the  influence  of 
institutional factors, such as corruption, in these developed countries. 
The results show that structural factors like GDP or Government Deficit are statistically 
significant and positive determinants of corporate tax revenue, using either the EATR or 
the EMTR as tax variable. 
We also looked the impact of cyclical determinants on the ratio of corporate tax revenue to 
GDP.  Our findings suggest  that  the  business performance  is  statistically  and  positively 
related to endogenous variable. We use Industry Turnover Index and GOSMI variables as a 
proxy of business performance. Additionally, the relationship between Unemployment Rate 
and corporate tax revenue is negative, as predicted. Moreover, we found that an increase in 
the number of enterprises may increase corporate tax revenue. 
We continued the analysis adding international factors like FDI and Openness Trade. Our 
findings demonstrate that more open economies should experience higher revenues at low 
tax  rates  and  lower  revenues  at  high  tax  rates.  Moreover,  FDI  is  positively  related  to 
corporate revenue.   
Then,  we  included  institutional  variables.  Among  the  institutional  determinants,  for 
example, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and corruption, we found that corruption has a significantly negative 
effect  on  corporate  tax  revenue.  However,  in  some  regressions  CPI loses  its  economic 
meaning, presenting a negative sign, which means that a better level of governance may 
lead to a smaller revenue collection.  31 
 
Furthermore, our findings show a parabolic relationship between the EMTR and corporate 
tax revenues as a share of GDP. It is important to point out that this finding does not imply 
that it is the optimal tax rate. Nonetheless, it reinforces the hypothesis of the existence of a 
Laffer curve. So at high EMTR the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the EMTR 
may exceed one, implying that an increase in EMTR will reduce corporate tax revenues. 
Regarding dummy variables, it is interesting to highlight that our results indicate that the 
last two years of European Union enlargement are likely not to have any effect in corporate 
tax revenue to GDP. In addition, specific factors of some countries like Greece, Portugal 
and Spain seem to be important determinants of variations in corporate revenues. 
In this sense, we can conclude that all analyzed variables play an important role in the ratio 
corporate tax revenue to GDP, but different determinants imply different effects. 
Although the  general of results are in line with the previous literature and predictions, 
several  data  limitations  put  constraints  on  the  present  analysis  like  the  lack  of  data  or 
variables that only represent few economic sectors, not covering all sectors (e.g., Total 
Number of Enterprises).  
In  addition,  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that  the  list  of  factors  that  could  potentially 
explain the corporate income tax revenue is extensive, and our analysis only  examines 
some of them. So many others determinants should be further studied.  
Finally, our results may have implications for governments. Governments should consider 
the impacts of fiscal harmonization, define sustained international policies that promote 
Trade Openness, delineate policies to fight the unemployment, create a good economic 
atmosphere to rise the number of enterprises, increase tax evasion penalties and punishment 
for corrupt tax administration. 
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Appendix 1 – Sketch of the revenue curves   
Figure 4: Revenue Curves 
  The revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate varies between 22.67% and 38.56% 
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